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Purpose: Critics of asset forfeiture claim that forfeiture laws create financial incentives that 
inappropriately influence police behavior. The present study examines the relationship between 
measures of the financial incentive and legal burdens for civil asset forfeiture on federal 
equitable sharing payments to local law enforcement to determine whether police behavior is 
affected by different statutory incentives for forfeiture activity. 
Methods: Using LEMAS and DOJ forfeiture data, this study addresses some of the limitations 
of previous research by using a multi-year average for forfeiture activity, an improved measure 
of financial incentives for law enforcement, and multiple measures of statutory burdens to law 
enforcement to determine the impact of forfeiture laws on forfeiture activity. 
Results: Consistent with anecdotal reports and limited prior research, findings indicate that 
agencies in jurisdictions with more restrictive state forfeiture laws receive more proceeds 
through federal equitable sharing. 
Conclusions: Results suggest that state and local law enforcement agencies use federal 
equitable sharing to circumvent their own state forfeiture laws when state laws are more 
burdensome or less financially rewarding to these agencies, providing additional evidence that 






All states and the federal government allow law enforcement to seize and forfeit cash, property, 
and other materials that they believe are associated with illegal activity (see Edgeworth, 2008). 
While there are variations among state and federal laws, the essence of such practices is quite 
similar: police or other investigative agencies seize cash or property (hereafter referred to as 
“assets”) suspected of being associated with criminal activity and then initiate forfeiture actions 
to permanently deprive an individual of those assets. Forfeiture allows the government to keep 
the seized cash and property (both personal and real), destroy the property, or sell the property 
and keep the proceeds to fund a number of activities. Depending on the law, these proceeds 
can be used for law enforcement purposes, such as to fund investigative activities or purchase 
equipment. The assets can also be used to pay restitution to crime victims, fund drug education 
programs, pay prosecutorial expenses, supplement school budgets, or be applied to the general 
fund of the city, county, or state (Edgeworth, 2008 and Williams, 2002b). Many states and the 
federal government, however, allow the proceeds from forfeitures to go to law enforcement 
agencies, resulting in allegations of “policing for profit” (e.g. Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998;Worrall, 
2004 and Worrall and Kovandzic, 2008). 
The question of whether law enforcement forfeiture activities are influenced by a “profit motive” 
has been subject to only a limited number of empirical studies (see Benson et al., 
1995 and Worrall and Kovandzic, 2008). Following the lead of Worrall and Kovandzic (2008), 
we examine whether local law enforcement agencies' decision to participate in the Federal 
government's equitable sharing program are influenced by the share of proceeds the agency 
could have received under their own state law. However, rather than measuring forfeiture 
proceeds dichotomously (either all proceeds to returned to law enforcement or less than 100 
percent), we use a more refined measure capturing the minimum percentage of proceeds that 
may be returned to law enforcement agencies under state law. In addition, we extend their 
earlier work by considering how procedural barriers, such as the standard of proof required for 
the state to prevail in forfeiture proceedings and which party has the burden to establish or 
defeat “innocent owner” claims, operate independently and in combination with each other to 
affect decisions on whether to pursue forfeiture actions through the federal equitable sharing 
program. 
The first section of the paper provides a brief overview of contemporary civil forfeiture laws. 
Next, we examine federal equitable sharing and the various reasons for its use by state and 
local law enforcement. The following section discusses how financial rewards and limited 
procedural safeguards provide powerful incentives to engage in “policing for profit” and reviews 
the limited research on this question. Following a description of the data and methods for the 
current study, results of the analyses is presented. In the final section, we consider the policy 
implications of our findings. 
Types of asset forfeiture 
Nearly all forfeiture actions begin when, in the course of their duties, law enforcement agents 
determine that there is probable cause to believe that illegal activity has occurred. Under such 
circumstances, the agents can seize any cash or other property from the owner that may be 
subject to forfeiture under current law. Thus, a seizure is when an officer of the law takes 
possession of an individual's property. This is typically the first step in the asset forfeiture 
process. For the police to seize an individual's property, most jurisdictions require that the officer 
merely have “probable cause” to believe the property is subject to forfeiture under existing law. 
Some jurisdictions, however, have additional requirements before real property can be seized. 
What happens after a seizure depends on the jurisdiction, the type of property seized, and the 
type of forfeiture that is being sought. The United States Department of Justice (2009) defines 
forfeiture as “the taking of property derived from a crime, involved in a crime, or that which 
makes a crime easier to commit or detect without compensating the owner” (p.8); although the 
degree of certainty required to demonstrate an association with criminal conduct varies and is a 
matter of some controversy ( Edgeworth, 2008 and Worrall, 2004). 
Very generally, there are two types of asset forfeitures – civil and criminal. The vast majority of 
states and the federal government allow for both types of forfeitures.1 Criminal forfeitures are 
called in personam (“against a person”) proceedings. In these proceedings, a forfeiture action 
occurs against a person after he/she has been convicted of an underlying criminal offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. There is generally little criticism about criminal asset forfeiture 
because of the due process protections afforded individuals in such proceedings. 
Civil forfeitures are called in rem proceedings, which translates from Latin as “against a thing” or 
“about a thing.” A person's property is the target of the proceeding and the owner or other 
interested party is secondary. Furthermore, because civil liberties extend only to individuals, and 
not to property, owners of seized property have fewer protections than in legal actions against 
the individuals themselves ( Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998; Hadaway, 2000). Most criticisms of 
asset forfeiture are directed against activities conducted under civil forfeiture laws. There are 
several forms of civil forfeiture. What the government is required to demonstrate in civil forfeiture 
proceeding varies depending on statutory language. While some state statutes have strict rules 
on the type of forfeiture actions required, other states and the federal government give law 
enforcement and prosecutors considerable discretion in selecting how to proceed in forfeiture 
actions (see generally Edgeworth, 2008). 
Once forfeited, cash can be distributed to law enforcement, prosecutors’ offices, schools, drug 
education and rehabilitation programs, or to the general fund of the city, county, or state. 
Property, such as cars, cell phones, or homes, can be kept for official use by law enforcement 
or it can be sold and the proceeds can be used in the same manner prescribed for cash 
forfeitures (see Edgeworth, 2008 and Williams, 2002b). 
Federal equitable sharing 
One of the lesser known aspects of asset forfeiture is the practice known as “equitable sharing”. 
The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 allows state and local law enforcement agencies 
to transfer assets and property they seize to federal law enforcement agencies. Federal law 
enforcement officials can take possession of this property and initiate federal forfeiture actions 
against the assets as long as the “conduct giving rise to the seizure is in violation of federal law 
and where federal law provides for forfeiture” (United States Department of Justice, 2009, p. 6). 
Seized assets transferred to the federal government through equitable sharing agreements may 
be forfeited regardless of whether an individual is charged, let alone convicted, of a crime in 
either state or federal court. If the assets are successfully forfeited to the federal government, 
the funds are deposited in the appropriate federal asset forfeiture fund. The Department of 
Justice Asset Forfeiture Fund (hereafter AFF) accepts funds from the majority of federal law 
enforcement agencies, including the FBI, DEA, and ATF. The Treasury Forfeiture Fund accepts 
deposits from Treasury agencies such as the Secret Service and financial and consumer 
agencies within the federal government. After the assets are forfeited and deposited into a 
federal forfeiture fund, state and local agencies receive a payment based on a percentage of the 
total value of the assets depending on the specific type and circumstances of that particular 
case (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2009). 
There are two forms of equitable sharing activities (U.S. Dept. of Justice, 2009). Joint 
investigative forfeitures are the result of investigative activities involving the cooperation of 
federal and state or local law enforcement agencies. These are particularly common with drug 
and gang task forces involving federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The 
percentage of funds shared with state and local agencies is a function of their role and effort in a 
particular seizure. Adoptive forfeitures occur when state and local agencies seize assets as the 
result of their investigation of state crimes. If the original crime is also a federal crime, the 
property is forfeitable under federal law. State and local agencies may then transfer seized 
property to federal law enforcement agencies that can elect to “adopt” this property for federal 
forfeiture proceedings. State and local agencies receive eighty (80) percent of the assets 
obtained from adoptive forfeitures and the federal government retains the remaining twenty (20) 
percent to offset costs associated with federal fund operations (U.S. Department of Justice, 
2009). 
The rationale for joint forfeitures is that the federal government can serve as the sole processor 
of potentially complicated seizure and forfeiture activities (Edgeworth, 2008 and Williams, 
2002a). Furthermore, for geographic areas that may involve a multi-state task force, the federal 
forfeiture laws can avoid conflicts between statutes affecting different state and local agencies, 
creating a more equitable return on agency participation. Adoptive forfeitures are more 
controversial and have been the subject of considerable scholarly criticism (Blumenson and 
Nilsen, 1998 and Worrall, 2004; Hadaway, 2000;Levy, 1996 and Duffy, 2001). Government 
officials (Cassella, 2007 and United States Department of Justice, 2008b) and proponents of 
adoptive forfeitures (Edgeworth, 2008) frequently cite improved inter-agency coordination and 
cooperation, more efficient forfeiture processing, and tougher federal criminal penalties for many 
crimes (especially drug crimes). Critics note that these are rather superficial rationales and 
argue that the most reasonable explanation is that it is in the financial interests of many state 
and local agencies to process forfeitures through the federal government rather than using their 
own existing state legal framework to do so (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998;Levy, 1996 and Worrall, 
2004). In effect, adoptive forfeitures allow state and local law enforcement to circumvent their 
own state laws and utilize federal law for processing forfeitures. 
There are several reasons that state and local agencies would elect to use equitable sharing. 
First, different states may require different standards of proof to forfeit property. Some of these 
are more restrictive than the federal government's preponderance of the evidence standard. 
When state and local agencies transfer seized property to the federal government for forfeiture, 
that property is subject to the federal government standard, even if the standard in the 
jurisdiction from which the property was originally seized was more restrictive (Duffy, 
2001 and United States Department of Justice, 2009). Thus, in some states, adoptive forfeitures 
are more likely to be successful if processed by the federal government than if they were 
retained and processed under state law. In essence, in some states, it is easier for the federal 
government to prevail in forfeiture actions. 
Second, while some state statutes require forfeiture funds to be used for non-law enforcement 
purposes, state and local agencies can enter into agreements with other agencies to coordinate 
and enhance forfeiture activities. The funds obtained through such multi-agency agreements 
may be distributed consistent with the terms of these agreements and are generally exempt 
from the statutory restrictions on the use of forfeiture funds. Furthermore, the federal 
government requires that any funds distributed through equitable sharing arrangements be used 
solely to fund continuing law enforcement activities, even for agencies in jurisdictions where law 
enforcement receives none of the proceeds from state forfeitures (United States Department of 
Justice, 2009). The federal government will discontinue equitable sharing agreements with an 
agency if it is discovered that funds are being used for non-law enforcement purposes – even if 
the state statute requires such use. In this manner, the federal government's asset forfeiture 
program helps state and local agencies avoid restrictions in state law that would increase the 
effort necessary to forfeit funds or diminish the incentives for law enforcement to engage in such 
activities in the first place ( Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998 and Duffy, 2001; Hadaway, 2000). 
Finally, in an effort to encourage the creation of independent task forces designed to target 
particular crimes such as drug sales and trafficking, equitable sharing payments may be used to 
pay the salary of officer positions created to replace officers assigned to task forces (United 
States Department of Justice, 2009;Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998; Hadaway, 2000). As long as an 
officer is assigned in a full-time capacity to the task force, equitable sharing payments may be 
used to pay the salary of a replacement officer on a one-to-one basis. This can occur even in 
states with statutory language prohibiting the use of forfeiture funds to pay officer salaries. 
While a number of factors weigh into particular forfeiture decisions, it is difficult to ignore the 
substantial difference in the return on investment for many law enforcement agencies to engage 
in equitable sharing activities compared with state forfeiture actions. Through equitable sharing, 
many law enforcement agencies are able to receive funds from assets that may not have been 
forfeited under state law, they may receive a larger percentage of the assets forfeited than state 
law allows, and they may be able to use those resources to fund activities and costs that would 
otherwise be prohibited (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998;Hadaway, 2000;Duffy, 2001).2 While 
Edgeworth (2008) claims that the United States Department of Justice (2008a) policy manual for 
asset forfeiture discourages adoptive forfeitures simply to avoid more burdensome state laws, 
the actual language in the policy manual seemingly encourages such actions. 3 
Financial incentives and “policing for profit” 
Perhaps the most significant criticism of asset forfeiture has focused on the purported financial 
incentives for law enforcement agencies to “police for profit” (Benson et al., 
1995 and Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998Hadaway, 2000;Skolnick, 2008, Worrall, 2001, Worrall, 
2004 and Duffy, 2001). As previously noted, most states allow law enforcement to keep a 
significant percentage, if not all, of the forfeiture proceeds from seizure activities. This, coupled 
with federal equitable sharing, provides opportunities for self-generating substantial agency 
resources. 
Advocates of forfeiture activities typically highlight the use of forfeiture funds to promote social 
goods, such as restitution to crime victims (Rider, 2007; Edgeworth, 2008), and downplay or 
criticize the use of forfeiture proceeds for internal revenue generation (e.g. Edgeworth, 
2008 and Williams, 2002a). They further maintain that such funds can only be used for 
statutorily approved purposes. As noted previously, however, the typical range of activities and 
expenses that are allowed under state statutes and equitable sharing arrangements represents 
significant benefits to law enforcement agencies.4 Occasionally, law enforcement officials and 
forfeiture advocates are quite explicit about the financial impact of forfeiture and its role in 
enforcement activities. AssetRecoveryWatch.com, a forfeiture training and advocacy 
organization, recently cited a senior U.S. Department official who, speaking at a conference in 
July 2009, “urged prosecutors and law enforcement officials to seize and forfeit more ill-gotten 
gains” (AssetRecoveryWatch.com, 2009). 
There have been very few empirical studies of asset forfeiture and our knowledge about the 
factors associated with forfeiture activity is based primarily on surveys of law enforcement 
(Vecchi and Sigler, 2001 and Worrall, 2001), examining changes in department budgets 
(Benson et al., 1995 and Worrall, 2001), participant observation (Miller & Selva, 1994), and 
investigative journalism reports (Burnett, 2008a, Burnett, 2008b, Burnett, 2008c, Burnett, 2008d, 
Poor and Rose, 1991a, Poor and Rose, 1991b, Poor and Rose, 1991c and Poor and Rose, 
1991d; see generally Keller & Wright, 2004). The limited empirical research on the topic, 
however, suggests that forfeiture creates powerful financial incentives and revenue production 
does influence operational decisions in some law enforcement agencies. Worrall (2001) 
surveyed 770 police managers and executives and found that almost forty (40) percent of 
respondents agreed or strongly agreed to the statement that civil forfeiture is “necessary as a 
budget supplement” (emphasis added). Evidence of this is further provided by Miller and Selva 
(1994) who found that police supervisors were keenly aware of the financial benefit of engaging 
in forfeiture activities and frequently made operational decisions to maximize perceived financial 
rewards. They report observing, “many such cases in which the operational goal was profit 
rather than the incarceration of drug offenders. The pursuit of profit clearly influenced policies on 
case selection” (Miller & Selva, 1994, p.325). Vecchi and Sigler (2001) claim that the direct 
payment of forfeiture funds by the federal government to federal, state, and local agencies 
represents “a virtual cash cow” for these agencies. 
Financial incentives may be particularly powerful for state and local law enforcement agencies 
that have limited resources and are susceptible to dynamic budgetary environments (Benson et 
al., 1995, Burnett, 2008c and Vecchi and Sigler, 2001). Benson et al. (1995) found that police 
bureaucracies’ aggressive enforcement of drug laws was associated with budgetary incentives 
for such activities (see also, Baicker & Jacobson, 2007). Burnett, 2008a, Burnett, 2008b, 
Burnett, 2008c and Burnett, 2008d reported that some Texas sheriffs’ departments rely on 
forfeited money for up to one-third of their budgets. While forfeiture activities certainly vary 
across jurisdictions, it appears that many law enforcement agencies consider asset forfeiture to 
be an essential source of continuing revenue (Burnett, 2008b; see also Benson et al., 
1995 and Worrall, 2001). Vecchi and Sigler (2001) claim that, despite claims otherwise, “(W)hat 
is evident from their behavior is that federal, state, and local governments use assets forfeiture 
to generate revenue” (p.75). 
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the importance of generating revenues through forfeiture is the 
political pressure the law enforcement lobby has exerted to prevent reforms to asset forfeiture 
laws at the state and federal level (Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998, Hyde, 1995, Levy, 
1996 and Worrall, 2004). Blumenson and Nilsen (1998) documented how lobbying by law 
enforcement resulted in considerable revisions and modifications to forfeiture reform efforts. 
Perhaps most noteworthy were lobbying efforts against amendments to federal asset forfeiture 
laws that would have required equitable sharing payments be distributed in a manner consistent 
with the seizing agencies’ own state forfeiture laws (Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998). The 
amendments were repealed before they became effective. Similarly, pressure from law 
enforcement interest groups watered down important provisions of the bill that eventually 
became the federal Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act (2000; hereafter “CAFRA”; Worrall, 2004). 
In addition, the law enforcement lobby was able to add provisions that actually strengthened 
forfeiture powers in some circumstances (see Worrall, 2004 and Edgeworth, 2008). 
Prior research suggests that revenue-generating incentives do influence law enforcement 
forfeiture activities. Furthermore, equitable sharing appears to be an important tool for many 
state and local law enforcement agencies that would be otherwise limited by state forfeiture 
laws. Dunn (n.d.) reported that, following passage of a Missouri state law requiring all forfeiture 
proceeds to be deposited in the state education fund, Missouri law enforcement agencies took 
specific steps to circumvent this law by increasing the use of equitable sharing activities rather 
than processing such cases under state forfeiture laws (see also von Kaenel, 1994). In one of 
the few empirical analyses of equitable sharing to date, Worrall and Kovandzic (2008) found that 
law enforcement agencies in jurisdictions where state law requires at least a portion of the 
proceeds from asset forfeitures to be used for law enforcement purposes had significantly 
higher levels of equitable sharing payments than agencies in jurisdictions where law 
enforcement could keep all such proceeds. The results indicated that law enforcement agencies 
in states that require law enforcement to share forfeiture proceeds are more likely to engage in 
equitable sharing in order to avoid state statutory restrictions. This is consistent with 
investigative reports (e.g. Burnett, 2008a, Burnett, 2008b, Burnett, 2008c and Burnett, 2008d) 
and scholarly research (Vecchi & Sigler, 2001;Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998) that highlight law 
enforcement efforts to maximize revenue production through equitable sharing. 
The present study seeks to build upon the work of Worrall and Kovandzic (2008) by re-
examining the extent to which law enforcement decisions to pursue forfeitures through federal 
equitable sharing agreements are influenced by different characteristics of their own state 
forfeiture laws. Critics of forfeiture contend that law enforcement operations are influenced by 
the perceived difficulty and rewards to engage in state forfeiture activities. If that is the case, 
equitable-sharing activities should be associated with state laws affecting the burden for the 
state to prevail in forfeiture activities and the percentage of the proceeds returned to law 
enforcement. If law enforcement agencies are circumventing their own laws in order to 
maximize revenue, this would provide additional evidence that police operations are influenced 
by a profit motive that has frequently been criticized by scholarly commentary (e.g. Skolnick, 
2008;Worrall, 2004;Duffy, 2001 and Hadaway, 2000). 
Methods 
The present study uses a cross-sectional research design to assess the impact of three different 
characteristics of state asset forfeiture laws on federal payments received by state and local law 
enforcement agencies through the Department of Justice's Assets Forfeiture Fund. The study 
sample for the present study was restricted to municipal agencies and sheriffs’ offices 
participating in the 2003 Law Enforcement and Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) survey (7th 
wave) with more than 100 full-time sworn officers and for which relevant data on two important 
potential confounding factors (e.g., drug arrest rate for manufacturing and selling of narcotic 
drugs and rate of violent crime) were not missing.5 The final sample size was 563 municipal 
police and sheriff's agencies. The decision to use agencies included in the LEMAS sample was 
based on the fact that it is nationally representative of all publicly funded state and local law 
enforcement agencies and includes information on many important potential confounding 
factors such as whether the agency is primarily responsible for drug enforcement in its locale 
and the number of full-time officers employed in a specialized drug unit or multi-agency drug 
task force. A more detailed discussion of the agency and community-level control variables 
included in the equitable sharing payment models is provided below. 
Explanatory variables – forfeiture laws 
Forfeiture laws differ from state to state and between states and the federal government. For 
purpose of the present study, the most relevant differences are those statutory requirements 
directly related to the financial incentive for law enforcement to engage in forfeiture activities 
(i.e. proceeds returned to law enforcement) and the procedural barriers to the government 
prevailing in forfeiture proceedings. In some states, forfeiture laws are more restrictive, meaning 
that it is more difficult for the government to prevail in forfeiture actions. In other states and the 
federal government, forfeiture laws are less restrictive, making it easier for the government to 
prevail and declare property forfeit. While some statutory variations are merely procedural and 
likely have minimal impact on forfeiture activities (see Edgeworth, 2008 for an exhaustive 
discussion of such differences), scholars and practitioners have identified several elements of 
forfeiture laws with important substantive and procedural implications (Blumenson & Nilsen, 
1998;Edgeworth, 2008, Sorens et al., 2008, Williams, 2002a and Worrall, 2004). Prior research 
indicates that two statutory elements, the burden in innocent owner claims and the standard of 
proof necessary for the state to demonstrate that property is subject to forfeiture, are particularly 
important burdens to the state (e.g. Edgeworth, 2008, Hyde, 1995, Sorens et al., 
2008 and Worrall, 2004). Combined, these laws represent significant incentives and barriers for 
law enforcement forfeiture activities and are used as the major predictors of forfeiture activity in 
the present study.6 
Forfeiture proceeds retained by law enforcement 
How the proceeds from forfeited assets are distributed, to whom, and restrictions on the use of 
those proceeds varies considerably across individual states as well as between states and the 
federal government. Some state statutes, for example, require that proceeds obtained through 
forfeiture activities be distributed for non-law enforcement purposes. In those jurisdictions where 
less than 100% of forfeiture proceeds are allocated to law enforcement, forfeiture assets may be 
used to fund drug treatment and education programs, special court programs, the general 
education fund of the jurisdiction, or even to the general fund of the budgeting agency or state. 
The percent of proceeds to law enforcement variable was coded based upon the minimum 
percentage of forfeiture proceeds to be returned to law enforcement according to state statute. 7 
This measurement strategy is superior to the “all-or-nothing” approach used by Worrall and 
Kovandzic (2008) who operationalized proceeds to law enforcement with a binary dummy 
variable coded 1 if state law provided 100 percent of proceeds be returned to law enforcement 
agencies and zero otherwise. Table 1 reveals the considerable variation across jurisdictions in 
the percentage of forfeiture proceeds that may be used for law enforcement. 8 
Burden of proof in “innocent-owner” defense claims 
State forfeiture laws can also be distinguished by the degree of difficulty or the burden for the 
government to prevail in forfeiture actions.9 In the present analyses, the degree of difficulty is 
measured by two aspects of forfeiture laws. The first measure is which party (government or 
property owner) has the burden to establish or defeat “innocent owner” claims. The creation of 
an “innocent owner” defense was prompted by the media reports of questionable forfeiture 
activities and the United States Supreme Court decision in Bennis v. Michigan (1996). In 
Bennis, the plaintiff's car was used without her knowledge by her husband to secure the 
services of a prostitute. The husband was arrested and the car seized. Under Michigan law, 
vehicles used for such purposes were subject to seizure and forfeiture. Furthermore, existing 
Michigan law did not provide for a defense based on an owner's lack of knowledge about the 
use of the vehicle for illegal purposes. The wife appealed the forfeiture of the vehicle. The U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled against the plaintiff and held that property owners do not have a 
constitutional right to an innocent-owner defense in civil forfeiture actions. The critical public and 
political reaction to this ruling led to the inclusion of an innocent-owner defense in the CAFRA 




addition, all remaining states that previously did not have an innocent-owner defense, including 
Michigan, eventually passed legislation barring the forfeiture of innocent-owner property. 10 In 
most jurisdictions, an innocent-owner defense is considered an “affirmative defense”. As a 
result, once the government has met its burden to demonstrate that the property is subject to 
forfeiture, the burden shifts to the purported owner to establish their “innocence”, which would 
exempt the property from forfeiture. The innocent owner burden variable, therefore, represents 
which party has the burden (the state or the property owner) to establish whether the property 
owner qualifies as an innocent owner under state law. 11 Table 2 summarizes which party has 
the burden of establishing whether an owner is statutorily “innocent” under various state laws. 
Standard of proof necessary to forfeit property12 
The second measure of statutory burden is the standard of proof required for the government to 
prevail in forfeiture proceedings. In American jurisprudence, different standards of proof are 
required for different types of legal issues or actions. Conceptually, these standards can be 
arranged on a continuum, rank ordering them from the least to the most difficult to establish. 
Reasonable suspicion is generally considered the lowest standard of proof. This is the standard 
required for the police to stop motorists suspected of moving violations and merely requires that 
an officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a moving violation occurred. Probable cause 
is an important concept in criminal justice because it represents the degree of certainty 
Probable cause is not easily defined and the courts have ruled that the “totality of the 
circumstances” should be considered in determining whether a particular conclusion was 
reasonable. It is the standard necessary in most jurisdictions to satisfy the seizure of property 
for forfeiture purposes. The preponderance of the evidence standard is commonly used in civil 
proceedings. An important distinction between preponderance and probable cause is that 
preponderance of the evidence implies a “more likely than not” character. Probable cause does 
not necessarily imply a greater degree of certainty, but rather an assessment of whether the 
party had good cause to engage in a particular action ( Tomkovicz, 1997; see also Illinois v. 
Gates, 1983). Thus, a preponderance standard is generally considered to be higher than mere 
probable cause ( Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2003). Importantly, the federal government 
utilizes the preponderance standard to determine whether property is subject to forfeiture. A 
clear and convincing standard is also used in some civil proceedings and is required for civil 
asset forfeiture in several states. It represents a higher degree of certainty than probable cause 
or preponderance, but is less than the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. Finally, beyond a 
reasonable doubt (occasionally phrased “reasonable certainty”) is the highest standard of proof 
found in American law and is most commonly associated with the standard required to convict a 
defendant of criminal charges. The reasonable doubt standard does not require absolute 
certainty; however, it does require more than clear and convincing evidence. Very few states 
require a beyond a reasonable doubt standard for asset forfeiture. In a limited number of states, 
all asset forfeiture actions are considered criminal in personam actions and require that a 
defendant be convicted of a crime for which asset forfeiture is a possible consequence of 
conviction. In addition, several states require a criminal conviction for particular types of crimes 
(in particular, certain drug law violations) before an individual's assets may be forfeited. It is not 
surprising that law enforcement officials and proponents of asset forfeiture often criticize and 
challenge the few state laws with such a difficult standard for the government to prevail in 
forfeiture activities ( Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998, Hadaway, 2000 and Worrall, 2004). 
For the present study, the standard of proof variable is a measure of the degree of certainty the 
government is required to meet to determine if property is subject to forfeiture. Some states 
require a different standard depending on the type of property. Most commonly, in states with 
two forfeiture standards, the higher one is for the forfeiture of real property such as land and 
homesteads and the lower standard is for seized cash and/or property under a specific dollar 
value. We considered these potentially meaningful distinctions and coded states with two 
standards as falling between the different standards. 13 Table 3 identifies the standard of proof 
required under different state laws. 
Dependent variable 
Similar to Worrall and Kovandzic (2008), we rely on measures of equitable sharing to determine 
whether agencies in more restrictive jurisdictions receive more equitable sharing proceeds. 
Specifically, the dependent variable in the following analyses is the per capita amount of 
equitable sharing payments of cash and sale proceeds returned to state and local law 
enforcement agencies through the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP).14 
The use of equitable sharing proceeds data is a meaningful test of whether equitable sharing is 
used to circumvent restrictive or less profitable state laws. Unlike Worrall and Kovandzic (2008) 
who used a single year measure of equitable sharing payments, we use a five-year average 
centered on the year 2002. Specifically, we average equitable-sharing payments received by 
agencies for fiscal years 2000 to 2004.15 The rationale for using a multi-year average is that it 
should provide a more reliable picture of an agency's reliance on equitable-sharing payments 
than estimates derived from a single-year which may be skewed by a few very large forfeitures. 
The average dollar amount by resident population is used to create a five-year average per  
equitable sharing payments of cash and sale proceeds returned to state and local law 
enforcement agencies through the Department of Justice's Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP).14 
The use of equitable sharing proceeds data is a meaningful test of whether equitable sharing is 
used to circumvent restrictive or less profitable state laws. Unlike Worrall and Kovandzic (2008) 
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agencies for fiscal years 2000 to 2004.15 The rationale for using a multi-year average is that it 
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The average dollar amount by resident population is used to create a five-year average per 
capita measure of equitable sharing payments. Equitable-sharing payments were obtained from 
audited reports overseen by the Office of the Inspector General.16 
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The use of equitable sharing proceeds data is a meaningful test of whether equitable sharing is 
used to circumvent restrictive or less profitable state laws. Unlike Worrall and Kovandzic (2008) 
who used a single year measure of equitable sharing payments, we use a five-year average 
centered on the year 2002. Specifically, we average equitable-sharing payments received by 
agencies for fiscal years 2000 to 2004.15 The rationale for using a multi-year average is that it 
should provide a more reliable picture of an agency's reliance on equitable-sharing payments 
than estimates derived from a single-year which may be skewed by a few very large forfeitures. 
The average dollar amount by resident population is used to create a five-year average per 
capita measure of equitable sharing payments. Equitable-sharing payments were obtained from 
audited reports overseen by the Office of the Inspector General.16 

Control variables 
Our analyses include numerous agency and community-level control variables. We were 
particularly concerned to control for variables that may have potentially preceded in causal time 
order (or occurred approximately at the same time), or mediated the relationship between state 
asset forfeiture laws and the per capita dollar value of assets seized. Failing to control for the 
former type of variables (i.e. antecedent variables) would lead to spurious correlations for the 
state asset forfeiture law variables. On the other hand, controlling for the latter set of variables 
(i.e. intervening variables) serves to clarify the nature of the relationship between state laws 
governing asset forfeiture and asset forfeiture activity engaged in by law enforcement. 
Specifically, we controlled for the number of full-time officers assigned to special or multi-agency 
drug enforcement units to examine whether such units mediate the link between state asset 
forfeiture laws and forfeiture activity. One might hypothesize, for example, that law enforcement 
agencies in less restrictive asset forfeiture states may be more inclined to assign a larger 
number of full-time officers to specialized drug units because doing so is likely to lead to more 
drug-related asset forfeiture activity and eventually, additional revenue for the agency. Data on 
the number of full-time officers assigned to specialized or multi-agency drug units were obtained 
from the LEMAS dataset. 
We also included the arrest rate (per 100,000 population) for drug manufacturing and selling 
and the violent crime rate (per 100,000 population) in the regression models because both 
variables may influence both the type of civil asset forfeiture statutes put in place by state policy 
makers and the amount of drug asset forfeiture activity a jurisdiction can reasonably be 
expected to engage in based on the sheer volume of drug-related transactions (i.e. more drug 
activity, more asset forfeiture). If this were true, failing to control for these potentially 
confounding variables would lead to spurious (or partly spurious) associations for the state 
asset forfeiture law variables. Data on the number of persons arrested for selling and 
manufacturing drugs was obtained from the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR). Similar to the dependent variables, we used a multi-year average (2001 
to 2003) to solve the problem that drug activity fluctuates widely from year-to-year. Data on the 
number of violent crimes (i.e. homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault) reported and 
recorded by law enforcement agencies for 2003 for each jurisdiction were also obtained from 
the FBI's UCR. Additional control variables included binary dummy variables denoting law 
enforcement agency type (1 = municipal agency, 0 = sheriff's department) and whether the 
agency was primarily responsible for enforcing drug laws in their respective jurisdiction (1 = yes, 
0 = no). Data for both variables were obtained from the 2003 LEMAS dataset. The last set of 
control variables are fixed effects dummy variables for each of the nine U.S. Census regions. 
The census region dummies are used to control for any well-established and unobserved (or 
unmeasured characteristics) of the jurisdictions served by law enforcement agencies that vary 
at the regional level and that could be expected to influence both state asset forfeiture laws and 
drug-related asset forfeiture activity. Examples of such potential confounders would be regions 
of the U.S. where drug trafficking is more commonplace, and regions of the U.S. in close 
proximity to a major port of entry for drugs. Table 4 provides a brief description of each variable 
used in the analyses along with their means and standard deviations. 
Study hypotheses 
Investigative journalism reports (e.g., Poor & Rose, 1991c) and prior studies on asset forfeiture 
(Levy, 1996;Hadaway, 2000;Vecchi and Sigler, 2001 and Worrall and Kovandzic, 
2008Blumenson & Nilsen, 1998;Duffy, 2001) have highlighted the importance of equitable 
sharing for state and local law enforcement. Specifically, these works contend that agencies in 
states with more restrictive and less profitable state laws engage in more equitable sharing 
activities to maximize their financial return on their forfeiture activities. Stated another way, 
agencies in jurisdictions with more rewarding or less burdensome forfeiture provisions are 
predicted to use federal equitable sharing less. Strictly speaking, it is not necessary for these 
agencies to utilize federal forfeiture procedures to obtain a meaningful financial return on their 
forfeiture operations. Similarly, the chances of prevailing in a forfeiture proceeding may actually 
be greater for agencies located in states where the burden-of-proof is lower at the state level 
than at the federal level. 
Perhaps more importantly, it is unlikely that the different provisions of state civil forfeiture laws 
act independently of one another. Rather, each provision is probably considered in conjunction 
with the other provisions by law enforcement executives in determining whether to process 
forfeiture activities through state law or federal equitable sharing. Therefore, we also examine 
the extent to which the main effects of each forfeiture provision on equitable sharing payments 
are modified by other provisions of the law. For example, agencies located in states that allow 
them to retain a sizable share of forfeiture proceeds will be even more disinclined to pursue 
equitable sharing payments if the state's standard of proof threshold to forfeit assets is lower 
than required under federal law. 
In the present study, we are able to test several recurring hypotheses about civil forfeiture that 
have, to date, been examined with rudimentary measures of state forfeiture laws or anecdotal 
evidence based on journalistic reports: 
Hypothesis 1. Law enforcement agencies located in states that allow them to receive larger 
percentages of forfeiture proceeds will receive lower equitable-sharing payments, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Law enforcement agencies located in states with lower standard of proof 
thresholds to forfeit assets will receive lower equitable-sharing payments, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 3. Law enforcement agencies located in states in which the burden of proof in a 
state innocent owner defense is on the property owner will receive lower equitable-sharing 
payments, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 4. Law enforcement agencies able to receive larger percentages of forfeiture 
proceeds under state law will receive lower equitable-sharing payments if the standard of proof 
threshold to forfeit assets is lowered, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 5. Law enforcement agencies able to receive larger percentages of forfeiture 
proceeds will receive lower equitable-sharing payments if the burden of proof in a state innocent 
owner defense is on the property owner, ceteris paribus. 
 
Hypothesis 6. Law enforcement agencies located in states with lower standards of proof 
thresholds will receive lower equitable-sharing payments if the burden of proof in a state 
innocent owner defense is on the property owner, ceteris paribus. 
Analytic procedures 
We used a censored regression model to determine the impact of three key components of 
state asset forfeiture laws on the per capita dollar value of equitable sharing payments received 
from the DOJ's AFF. Censored regression models take into account potential biases that may 
be present when some observations on the dependent variable are not observable, as is the 
case here. In the present study, the equitable sharing payment variable is concentrated at the 
lower limit value of zero as roughly eleven percent (63 out of 563) of the agencies in the study 
sample received no equitable sharing payments from the DOJ between fiscal years 2000 to 
2004. The appropriate censored regression model in this case is the Tobit model (see Tobin, 
1958). Tobit regression estimates a linear regression model for a left-censored dependent 
variable, where the dependent variable is censored from below. 
If the probability of zero dollars related to equitable sharing payments were the only 
phenomenon to explain, probit regression would provide a suitable model. Of course, this would 
result in throwing away information on the value of equitable sharing payments received when it 
is available. That is the case here because if a law enforcement agency received an equitable 
sharing payment from DOJ, we know precisely how much they received. On the other hand, if 
there were no concentrations at a lower limit, and we only cared to explain the per capita dollar 
amount of equitable sharing payments received, OLS would be the appropriate regression 
estimator. But, since there is a piling up of values of the dependent variable at a limit (in this 
case $0), OLS estimates are biased because the dependent variables are not continuous and 
unbounded. The solution to this problem is a hybrid of the two regression methods (probit and 
OLS) which economists refer to as Tobit models. Similar to standard OLS regression, the Tobit 
regression model assumes the error terms are normally distributed, independent between 
observations and uncorrelated with the independent variables. Model parameters are estimated 
via maximum likelihood. 
Although it is useful to examine ordinary Tobit coefficients for sign and significance, they are not 
readily interpretable as effect sizes like their ordinary least squares (OLS) counterparts 
(Wooldridge, 2005). The reason interpretation of Tobit coefficients are more problematic than 
traditional regression coefficients is because the former must account for two distinct types of 
observations on the dependent variable. The first set contains the observations for which the 
dollar value of equitable sharing payments received is zero. For these observations we know 
only the values of the independent variables and the fact that the dependent variable is less 
than or equal to zero. The second set consists of all observations for which the value of both the 
independent and dependent variables are known. Thus, two types of effects are modeled 
simultaneously in a Tobit regression model: (1) the effect on the per capita dollar value of 
equitable sharing payments received for cases with a nonzero value (uncensored) and (2) the 
effect on the probability of having a nonzero value for cases with the limit value of zero dollars 
(censored). 17 A problem arises, however, because only a single coefficient is provided in the 
output of a Tobit analysis for each of the two state asset forfeiture law variables. Clearly, 
however, it is not possible for a single coefficient to capture both effects—one for cases at the 
lower limit value (zero dollars) and another for cases above the limit value (nonzero dollars).18 
Fortunately, a decomposition procedure developed by McDonald and Moffitt (1980) can be used 
to disentangle Tobit coefficients in such a way that both different effects are quantified: (1) the 
effect of state asset forfeiture laws on the per capita dollar value of payments received from 
DOJ and (2) the effect of the laws on the probability of a law enforcement agency receiving a 
equitable sharing payment for those agencies failing to receive payments during the study 
period. Decomposing the Tobit coefficients provides for a more complete understanding of the 
two separate effects state asset forfeiture laws can have on equitable sharing payment 





For purposes of interpretation, it is important to remember that the hypotheses under 
examination postulate different relationships. A negative relationship is predicted between the 
proceeds to law enforcement variable and equitable sharing, i.e. the greater the return on 
forfeiture actions under state law, the less likely agencies are to utilize federal equitable sharing. 
A positive relationship is hypothesized between the burden variables and equitable sharing 
receipts. The more burdensome the state law is on the government (i.e. higher standard or 
government burden in innocent owner defenses), the more likely law enforcement is to process 
their forfeiture actions through equitable sharing. It is also worth noting that all three law 
variables were centered around zero by subtracting the middling value of each variables scale 
from each agencies own value for that particular law variable. For example, the law variable 
measuring standard of proof value is centered such that an agency with a previous score of four 
is transformed to a score of zero while an agency with an original score of seven is transformed 
to a score of three. The rationale for centering the law variables in this manner was to facilitate 
the interpretation of subsequent Tobit regression models using two-way interaction terms 
between the three state law variables. 
Table 5 presents results from a Tobit regression model relating per capita equitable-sharing 
payments received by law enforcement agencies to three important elements of state asset 
forfeiture laws: (1) the percent of forfeiture proceeds returned to law enforcement, (2) the 
“standard of proof” required by state law to determine whether property is subject to forfeiture, 
and (3) which party has the “burden of proof” in an innocent owner defense. Robust standard 
errors, which are clustered at the state level, are presented in brackets under the regression 
coefficients. Due to space limitations, coefficient estimates for the region fixed effects are not 
shown. 
As seen in Table 5, the coefficients for all three state asset forfeiture variables are in the 
expected theoretical direction and statistically distinguishable from zero, although the coefficient 
for the percent of forfeiture proceeds variable is only significant at the more generous .10 level. 
Beginning with the share of forfeiture proceeds variable, the results indicate that law 
enforcement agencies residing in generous forfeiture states receive significantly lower equitable 
sharing payments. The finding that law enforcement agencies in less generous states process 
more forfeitures as equitable sharing forfeitures is consistent with the findings reported by 
Worrall and Kovandzic (2008) and provides initial support for Hypothesis 1. With respect to the 
legal hurdles faced by agencies in forfeiting assets, the positive coefficient on the state standard 
of proof variable provides empirical support for Hypothesis 2 and indicates that law enforcement 
agencies located in states with higher “standard of proof” thresholds receive greater amounts of 
equitable sharing proceeds. Thus, it appears that the “standard of proof” component of state 
forfeiture laws plays a significant and independent role in forfeiture decisions made by law 
enforcement. Lastly, the coefficient for the innocent owner variable indicates that placing the 
burden of proof in innocent owner defenses largely on the state is statistically associated with 
larger equitable sharing payments, a result that is consistent with Hypothesis 3. Although these 
standard interpretations are informative, the decomposition procedure discussed above 
provides additional substantive information regarding the effects of the state asset forfeiture 
variables on per capita proceeds received through equitable sharing payments. For example, 
the coefficient in Column 2 for the share of proceeds variable indicates that among law 
enforcement agencies receiving equitable sharing payments between fiscal years 2000 to 2004 
(Column 2), a 1 percent increase in the share of forfeiture proceeds that could be returned to 
the agency under state law is associated with a .0008-cent per capita reduction in equitable-
sharing payments. Using a more realistic percentage increase rate of 25 percent, this figure 
would jump to roughly 2 cents per capita. With regards to the probability of receiving an 
equitable-sharing payment among agencies with no payments (Column 3), the results imply a 
.0008 lower probability of receiving an equitable sharing payment for every 1 percent increase in 
the percentage of forfeiture proceeds that can be returned to the initiating agency.20 
 
Next, we explored the possibility of two-way interactions between the three state forfeiture law 
variables. We believe there is a strong theoretical basis to expect that the effects of any one 
characteristic of state asset forfeiture laws on equitable-sharing payments may be moderated by 
another aspect of the law. For example, agencies located in states where the standard of proof 
required by authorities to forfeit assets is greater (e.g., beyond a reasonable doubt) than the 
“preponderance of evidence” requirement at the federal level may be more inclined to turn 
forfeiture cases over to federal authorities even if state law permits agencies to keep a generous 
portion of the forfeited proceeds. Conversely, agencies located in more generous states with 
similar standard of proof requirements for seizing assets may be less inclined to turn cases over 
to federal authorities. 
The results of the interaction analysis are reported in Table 6. These interactions must be 
interpreted with care. Most importantly, the statistical significance of each law variable in 
isolation cannot be determined by simply looking at their t-ratios separately. In other words, the 
fact that the coefficient for the innocent owner variable is not significantly different from zero 
does not mean this characteristic of forfeiture restrictiveness does not have a significant impact 
on equitable sharing payments. Rather, the statistical significance of each law variable can only 
be determined when testing its importance in conjunction (referred to as a joint hypothesis test) 
with the interaction terms of which it is a part. Indeed, the F statistic testing the joint hypothesis 
of each interactions involving the innocent owner variable are statistically significant. 
The results clearly show that the interaction terms have a significant effect on per capita 
equitable sharing payments. Beginning with the two-way interaction between the share of 
forfeiture proceeds returned to law enforcement and the standard of proof variable, the results 
indicate agencies located in more generous forfeiture states will rely less heavily on federal 
forfeiture programs as the standard of proof for the government to prevail in state forfeiture 
actions is decreased. Specifically, per capita equitable-sharing proceeds for agencies located in 
states where the standard of proof required to forfeit assets is lowered from 
“preponderance/clear and convincing” to “prima facie/probable cause,” i.e. from 0 to − 3) can be 
expected to decrease by 2 cents per person [10*.001 + 10*-3*(.0004) = −.002] for each 10 
percent increase in the share of proceeds returned to law enforcement. This finding is 
consistent with Hypothesis 4. 
Turning our attention to the results for the interaction term between the share of forfeiture 
proceeds and the innocent owner variable, results indicate that law enforcement agencies 
located in generous forfeiture states in which the burden of proof is on the state to show the 
property forfeited was ill-gotten, rely less heavily on equitable-sharing payments. For example, 
per capita equitable-sharing payments for agencies located in states where the burden in 
innocent owner defenses is on the government can be expected to increase by 3-cents per 
[10*.001 + 10*1*(.002) = .03] for every 10 percent increase in state proceeds returned to law 
enforcement. On the other hand, a similar 10 percent increase can be expected to reduce per 
capita equitable sharing proceeds by 1- cent per person [10*.001 + 10*-1(.002) = 0.01] when the 
burden of proof standard is on the claimant. Simply put, for agencies expecting large returns on 
forfeiture activity, placing the burden of proof on the owner to establish his or her innocence 
equates to less reliance on federal forfeiture programs. 

Lastly, the interaction term between the standard of proof and innocent owner law variables 
provides additional evidence that law enforcement agencies consider the restrictiveness of state 
forfeiture laws (in addition to the share of proceeds potentially returned) when making decisions 
on asset forfeiture activity. The coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the effects of the 
burden of proof threshold on per capita equitable-sharing payments differ significantly 
depending on whether the owner or government has the burden of proof in innocent owner 
defenses. Specifically, in states where the owners are presumed innocent (i.e. the burden is on 
the government to establish an owner's guilt), raising the standard of proof by one unit has the 
net effect of increasing per capita equitable-sharing payments by .057 cents per 
person[1*.030 + 1*1*(.027) = .057] as compared to only .003 cents per person [1*.030 + 1*-
1*(.027) = .003] when the burden switches from the government to the owner. Taken together, 
these results indicate that all three characteristics of state asset forfeiture laws operate both 
independently and in tandem with each other in explaining the amount of proceeds state and 
local law enforcement agencies can expect to receive through the Department of Justice's 
Assets Forfeiture Fund. 
With respect to the control variables, the most notable finding is the significant negative 
association between the drug arrest rate and equitable-sharing payments. The most likely 
explanation is that agencies in high drug activity areas are also located in more generous 
forfeiture states. However, the results shown in Table 6 suggest this is not a very compelling 
explanation as the coefficient for the drug arrest rate was tiny and statistically insignificant. On 
the other hand, the coefficient for the violent crime rate variable indicates agencies embedded in 
high crime areas receive significantly greater equitable-sharing payments from DOJ. Lastly, the 
dummy variable for agency type shows that municipal agencies receive larger equitable-sharing 
payments than sheriff's offices. 
Conclusion 
The present study sought to investigate claims that police forfeiture behavior is affected by 
perceptions of the financial rewards for such activities. Using equitable sharing payments as the 
dependent variable of interest provides an opportunity to assess the relative importance of both 
financial incentive (i.e. equitable sharing forfeiture proceeds) and perceived effort (i.e. state 
standard of proof and innocent owner burden) in organizational decision-making regarding how 
to process forfeiture actions. It is worth noting that these are not merely theoretical speculations. 
As discussed earlier, there is substantial anecdotal evidence that law enforcement utilize a 
variety of tactics to generate the greatest revenue from their forfeiture operations. The present 
study merely examines prior commentary and observations with representative, national data. 
Results from the present study demonstrate that all three factors of state forfeiture law that we 
studied - proceeds to law enforcement, innocent owner burden, and standard of proof - impact 
the extent to which state and local law enforcement agencies choose to pursue federal 
equitable sharing. Moreover, when state laws make forfeiture more difficult and less rewarding, 
agencies are even more apt to turn to the federal government's easier and more generous 
forfeiture procedures. This suggests that different aspects of forfeiture laws are associated with 
police activities in complex ways. While using a single measure to characterize a jurisdiction's 
forfeiture laws will likely be inadequate, the different measures of forfeiture laws used in our 
analyses were related to equitable sharing payments, both independently and in interaction with 
one another, in the hypothesized direction. Importantly, all of these findings held true - and 
indeed, became stronger - after controlling for relevant control variables such as drug arrests 
and violent crime rates. Put another way, the number of drug arrests or violent crimes in an area 
or the size or mission (drug-related or not) of a law enforcement agency does not “explain away” 
the effects of hurdles to forfeiture in state law. Even comparing similar agencies in similar crime-
rate areas, the agencies in states with more restrictive and less generous state laws will use 
equitable sharing more, presumably in an effort to avoid such laws. This also suggests, though 
indirectly, that states that make forfeiture more difficult and less rewarding see less forfeiture 
under state law (see Baicker & Jacobson, 2007). 
Like all social science research on organizational behavior, the present study suffers from 
several important limitations. Because it was not possible to estimate the total amount of 
forfeiture monies received by law enforcement agencies under their own civil forfeiture program 
for a large national sample of agencies, we were unable to directly examine whether agencies 
located in less restrictive forfeiture states pursue more vigorously civil asset forfeitures than in 
the more restrictive states. Instead, the present study examined the related question of whether 
agencies located in more restrictive forfeiture states are more likely to pursue civil forfeiture 
actions federally through the Department of Justice's Assets Forfeiture Program. Another 
limitation is that the dependent variable is based upon total proceeds and not the number of 
forfeiture actions processed. While the latter may be a better measure of forfeiture activity, that 
information does not exist for a large national sample of law enforcement agencies and, to our 
knowledge, is not available for even a single state. The five-year average for equitable sharing 
proceeds was used to minimize the impact of possible effects of outlier forfeiture activity, but 
this is certainly not a perfect solution. Finally, it is certain that our analyses overlooked important 
contextual factors that likely influence forfeiture activity by particular law enforcement agencies 
and perhaps within particular states (e.g. Baicker and Jacobson, 2007, Burnett, 2008a, Burnett, 
2008b, Burnett, 2008c, Burnett, 2008d and Keller and Wright, 2004; Poor & Rose, 1991;Vecchi 
and Sigler, 2001 and von Kaenel, 1994). The purpose of the study was not to explain forfeiture 
activity, but to use data for a very large and nationally representative sample of municipal law 
enforcement agencies to test critics’ contentions that state forfeiture laws influence operational 
decisions by the police. We believe that this study is a meaningful effort towards answering 
such questions (Baumer, 2008). 
It is likely that some will simply interpret the results of the present study as demonstrating the 
resourcefulness and creativity of law enforcement in securing organizational resources. In 
particular, the idea that complex organizations seek to maximize financial revenues and 
minimize the effort necessary to obtain resources is not surprising. However, the possibility of 
revenue-generating behavior by the police is not without its critics (e.g. Blumenson and Nilsen, 
1998, Hyde, 1995, Levy, 1996 and Skolnick, 2008). A detailed examination of these criticisms is 
beyond the scope of this paper (but see Blumenson and Nilsen, 1998, Duffy, 2001, Hadaway, 
2000 and Worrall, 2004). In general, however, the powerful incentives for profit-seeking found 
within forfeiture current laws is criticized as encouraging inappropriate enforcement activities 
and detracting from the proper role of law enforcement within a democratic state. The 
dependency of the police on public resources for their operations is an important check on 
police power. Self-generating revenues by the police through forfeiture potentially threatens the 
ability of popularly elected officials to constrain police activities. Perhaps such concerns partially 
explain the differences in state laws. If the legislators and the public wished for forfeiture to be 
very easy and rewarding to law enforcement, every state would have low standards of proof, 
limited innocent owner protections, and all proceeds would go exclusively to the police. 
In sum, the present study found that law enforcement agencies in jurisdictions with more 
restrictive or less rewarding state forfeiture laws receive greater forfeiture proceeds through 
federal equitable sharing. These results provide compelling evidence that law enforcement 
agencies consider the legal burdens and financial rewards of their own state law compared to 
those under federal equitable sharing in determining how to process asset seizures. Whether 
such actions are viewed as appropriate, innovative, and utility-maximizing police behavior or 
something more problematic is a matter for the public and policy-makers to assess. Any 
discussion about these results, however, certainly raises political and normative questions about 
the independence of law enforcement from public oversight and the budgetary process as well 
as the appropriate role and limits of asset forfeiture by law enforcement. 
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Notes: 
1. Given the numerous variations across state and federal laws addressing forfeiture, much of 
the discussion about procedures and practice is rather general and it must be acknowledged 
that jurisdictional differences exist. We have chosen to only highlight those legal and procedural 
differences that have substantive relevance to actual practice and present analyses. 
 
2. Even advocates of forfeiture activities acknowledge the circumvention of state forfeiture laws 
by law enforcement. For example, Edgeworth (2008) notes that while some states have 
homestead exemptions that preclude the forfeiture of real property that qualifies as a 
homestead, “a state homestead exemption is not a defense to a federal real property forfeiture 
case because the federal supremacy clause preempts the state exemption…. Therefore, in 
jurisdictions with state homestead exemptions, law enforcement will use the federal forfeiture 
system for any real property that may be exempted under state law” (p.248; see also Duffy, 
2001 and von Kaenel, 1994). 
 
3. According to the “Request for Adoption of State or Local Seizures” form (Appendix H), “As a 
general rule, if a state or local agency has seized property as part of ongoing state criminal 
investigation, and if the criminal defendants are being prosecuted in state court, the forfeiture 
action should also be pursued in state court. However certain circumstances may make federal 
forfeiture appropriate. These circumstances include, but are not limited to the following: (1) state 
laws or procedures are inadequate or forfeiture experience is lacking in the state system with 
the result that a state forfeiture action may be unfeasible or unsuccessful” (emphasis added; 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2008a, p. H-2). 
 
4. Recently, the U.S. Department of Justice ruled that law enforcement agencies may use 
equitable sharing proceeds to help fund the creation of a National Law Enforcement Museum 
(Shanks & Morison, 2008). To date, over $10 million of the estimated $80 million in construction 
costs have been donated by law enforcement agencies and the Department of Justice has ruled 
that future equitable sharing funds may be used to offset the operational costs of such a facility 
(Shanks & Morison, 2008).  
5. The 2003 LEMAS sample was mailed to 3,154 agencies in December 2003. The sampling 
frame for the 2003 LEMAS survey was the 2000 Census of State and Local Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CSLLEA). Of the 3,154 agencies surveyed, 955 employed 100 or more sworn officer 
as of June 30, 2000. These 955 self-representing (SR) agencies included 574 local police 
departments, 332 sheriffs’ offices, and 49 State law enforcement agencies. Self-reporting 
agencies in the LEMAS survey were defined as those agencies with 100 or more sworn full-time 
equivalent (FTE) employees and all State police agencies. The SR agencies were 
supplemented by a nationally representative stratified random sample of 2,199 nonself-
representing (NSR) agencies (1,539 local police departments and 660 sheriffs’ offices) with less 
than 100 sworn personnel. The stratification variables used for the NSR agencies included the 
type of agency (local or sheriff), size of population served, and number of sworn personnel. The 
overall response rate for the 2003 LEMAS survey was 90.6 percent (n = 2,859 agencies). 
6. The method for distinguishing state asset forfeiture laws as reported in Table 1, 
Table 2 and Table 3 was based on the following research strategy. First, the authors reviewed 
the civil asset forfeiture statutes in each of the fifty states and coded each of these measures 
based on legal distinctions similar to those reported in Sorens, Muedini, and Ruger (2008). 
Next, the authors compared several existing sources (most notably Edgeworth, 2008, Sorens et 
al., 2008 and Worrall, 2004) for each measure for all states to minimize errors. Finally, each 
variable for each state was compared with the independent assessment by legal research staff 
at the Institute for Justice, a non-profit legal policy organization. This was done merely as an 
additional interrater reliability check. There were very few differences between our coding and 
that reported in other sources. The differences that did exist were typically the result of either 
errors by previous researchers or their focus on a different aspect of forfeiture laws. A very 
limited number of states have different statutory elements for drug-related cases. Scholarly and 
investigative journalistic reports on forfeiture overwhelmingly focus on forfeiture actions related 
to the war on drugs and in drug cases. Furthermore, the LEMAS measure on asset forfeiture 
specifically requests information pertaining to assets forfeited in association with enforcement of 
drug laws. Therefore, our decision was to code states based upon the laws regulating forfeiture 
in drug cases. These jurisdictions are noted within the appropriate table. 
 
7. All state and the federal forfeiture statutes provide for the initial deduction of certain costs and 
expenses from the gross proceeds of forfeited assets. The required expenses to be covered 
vary, but may include property management costs, forfeiture processing expenses, 
reimbursement of third party interests, and victim restitution. Given that all jurisdictions require 
initial costs to be deducted from gross forfeiture revenues, the reported percentage of proceeds 
returned to law enforcement is perhaps best considered the percentage of net proceeds that are 
minimally allocated to law enforcement. The forfeiture distribution language within some statutes 
was imprecise in terms of the actual percentage guaranteed to law enforcement. In states with 
some vagueness, we coded the data based upon our reading of the statute and compared this 
coding with information reported in other sources (Edgeworth, 2008) and with independent 
assessments by the legal research staff at the Institute for Justice. We are confident that these 
procedures produced the most accurate assessment of proceeds to law enforcement. For any 
statutes with some remaining vagueness, however, our guiding principle was to code the 
percentages conservatively and in a manner that, if inaccurate, would bias results contrary to 
finding a significant relationship between the percentages and forfeiture revenue collected by 
agencies. 
 
8. For this table, any percentage of funds required to be allocated to prosecutors and district 
attorneys were included as “law enforcement”. Few states require a specific percentage of net 
proceeds to be allocated to prosecutors and, where present, are typically marginal (see 
Edgeworth, 2008, Table 10-1). Some states, however, require all forfeiture proceeds to be 
distributed by the district attorney associated with the seizing agency and other states’ statutes 
are quite vague about the distinction between distributions to law enforcement and prosecutorial 
operations. Given the importance of cooperative relationships between police and prosecutors 
in forfeiture activities and the lack of distinction in many statutes, prosecution and district 
attorney allocations were included in law enforcement percentages. Examples of required 
allocations that were not counted as “law enforcement” include drug treatment programs, court 
expenses, and drug education programs (e.g. D.A.R.E. programs). The latter was identified in 
many statutes as an activity that “may” be funded with forfeiture proceeds, but very few required 
a specific percentage of net proceeds to be allocated to such programs. Statutory citations for 
Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 are available upon request. 
 
9. see generally, Edgeworth, 2008, Sorens et al., 2008 and Worrall and Kovandzic, 2008. 
 
10. While the innocent owner defense in CAFRA is nearly universally agreed as progress, 
problems remain. The requirements and evidence necessary to establish an innocent owner 
defense vary across jurisdictions and may be difficult for innocent owners to demonstrate. In 
addition, the standard of proof necessary for an owner to establish innocence varies across 
jurisdictions. In most jurisdictions, the standard of proof is preponderance of the evidence; 
however, some states require innocent owners to demonstrate by clear and convincing 
evidence that their property should not be subject to forfeiture (Edgeworth, 2008). 
 
11. This was coded as follows (lower numbers reflect less burden on the state): 1 = the burden 
to establish innocence rests exclusively with the property owner/claimant; 2 = the burden varies 
depending on the type of property being forfeited and 3 = the burden rests exclusively with the 
government to establish that the claimant is not innocent. The coding strategy for the burden 
variables was similar to that utilized by Sorens et al., 2008. 
 
12. Two important legal concepts are the “burden of proof” and “standard of proof”. Although the 
terms are occasionally used interchangeably, for the purposes of this study, it is important to 
keep them distinct. Burden and standard of proof issues are some of the most controversial 
aspects of civil asset forfeiture. Most generally, the burden of proof indicates which party is 
required to establish its case. In asset forfeiture actions, the government has the burden of 
establishing that the property in question is subject to forfeiture. However, under federal law and 
many state laws, a property owner has the burden to establish that they are an innocent owner 
and that their property should be exempt from forfeiture (see Table 2). The standard of proof 
represents the degree of certainty the burdened party must meet to successfully prevail in a 
legal dispute. 
 
13. The standard of proof variable was coded as follows (lower numbers reflect less burden on 
the state): 1 = prima facie/probable cause; 2 = probable cause and preponderance of the 
evidence; 3 = preponderance of the evidence; 4 = preponderance and clear and convincing; 
5 = clear and convincing; 6 = clear and convincing and beyond a reasonable doubt and 
7 = beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
14. The most desirable test of the relationship between different state asset forfeiture laws and 
forfeiture activity would be to utilize data on reported forfeited assets by law enforcement 
against measures of different state forfeiture laws in those jurisdictions. While researchers have 
used LEMAS survey forfeiture variable to test this relationship (e.g. Worrall & Kovandzic, 2008), 
upon further investigation, it appears that the LEMAS forfeiture measure has reliability problems 
for this purpose. The question in the LEMAS survey asks agencies to report the total amount of 
forfeiture proceeds received the previous calendar year as the result of participation in a drug 
asset forfeiture program. Thus, LEMAS forfeiture totals are based exclusively on forfeitures 
associated with drug-related offenses. Furthermore, the LEMAS survey does not ask agencies 
to distinguish proceeds obtained via equitable sharing activities compared with state laws 
(resulting in potentially serious measurement error for the forfeiture law variables). Finally, the 
number reported is based upon funds received by (and not forfeited by) law enforcement 
through forfeiture proceedings and excludes assets forfeited and distributed for non-law 
enforcement purposes. As a result, agencies in those states requiring the distribution of 
forfeiture proceeds for non-law enforcement purposes will only report the amount of assets they 
were able to keep under state law and/or the amount returned to the agency through equitable 
sharing. Thus, the LEMAS forfeiture variable actually measures only the amount of assets 
returned to an agency as a result of forfeitures associated with drug-enforcement activities and 
not the actual total assets forfeited as a result of that agency's actions. It may be possible to 
create estimates of non-reported forfeitures in jurisdictions receiving at least some percentage 
of forfeiture proceeds by applying weights to the dollars received by the percentage of forfeiture 
proceeds that are returned to that agency under law. The real measurement problem is for 
agencies in jurisdictions that are unable to retain any proceeds. In such jurisdictions, there will 
be an unknown amount of forfeiture activity that is not reported in the LEMAS survey measure; 
making it impossible to calculate reliable estimates of forfeiture activity for those agencies. To 
our knowledge, it is impossible to determine the actual total assets forfeited by state and local 
agencies with LEMAS or any other nationally representative data source. 
 
15. Since the outcome variable was based on multi-year averages, it was necessary to review 
all state statutes to determine any if statutory changes occurred to the primary variables of 
interest during this time. A few states did change their forfeiture laws and these changes were 
coded into the dataset where appropriate to reflect the changes in law affecting law enforcement 
agencies in those states. 
 
16. These are available at the Asset Forfeiture Program's website: 
www.usdoj.gov/jmd/afp/02fundreport/index.htm. 
 
17. In our case the latent dependent variable is the propensity of law enforcement agencies to 
engage in asset forfeiture activity, but this dollar value is only realized if that capacity exceeds 
zero dollars. So, although many law enforcement agencies may have reported zero dollars 
related to drug asset forfeiture activity on the realized variable, they can be considered as 
having differing scores on the latent variable. 
 
18. The Tobit coefficient represents the effect of an independent variable on the latent 
(unobserved) dependent variable. Because the latent dependent variable is not observed 
(otherwise we wouldn't need to use a censored regression model), it is rarely interpreted by 
researchers. 
 
19. One potential pitfall with using local law enforcement data in a study examining the effects of 
state laws is that the law variables do not vary across jurisdictions within a particular state. As a 
result, errors in predicting asset forfeiture are likely to be correlated within clusters (i.e. states) 
and conventional estimates of standard errors for the state asset forfeiture law variables may be 
understated due to violations of the independence assumption (Moulton, 1990). To address this 
problem, we used cluster-adjusted standard errors that adjust for the fact that observations 
within states may not be independent (Williams, 2000). 
 
20. It is important to remember that while effects appear marginal, they are per capita. Based 
upon the results from Table 5, a law enforcement agency serving an average sized population 
(300,000) that receives zero proceeds from state forfeiture actions would be expected to 
receive, on average, $24,000 more in equitable sharing payments as compared to an agency 
that receives 100% of state forfeiture proceeds. Additionally, switching the burden of proof in 
innocent owner defense from the property owner to the government increased expected 
equitable sharing payments by $25,680 for an average sized agency, Given that many law 
enforcement agencies serve populations much larger than 300,000, results indicate that 
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